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Between the Species
The Chicken Challenge:
What Contemporary Studies of Fowl
Mean for Science and Ethics

ABSTRACT
Studies with captive fowl have revealed that they possess greater cognitive capacities than previously thought. We now know that fowl
have sophisticated cognitive and communicative skills, which had
hitherto been associated only with certain primates. Several theories
have been advanced to explain the evolution of such complex behavior. Central to these theories is the enlargement of the brain in species
with greater mental capacities. Fowl present us with a conundrum,
however, because they show the behaviors anticipated by the theories
but do not have the expected changes in the brain. Consequently fowl
present two challenges of interest to us here. One is a scientific challenge to explain their remarkable capabilities. The other is an ethical
challenge regarding our treatment of animals with higher cognitive
skills.
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1. Introduction
Research with nonhuman animals (including primates, marine mammals and corvids) has revealed that these social species exhibit an array of complex behaviors initially believed
to be unique to humans, including tool use, problem solving
and innovation as well as referential and representational communication. Current theories regarding the evolution of these
seemingly advanced cognitive abilities correlate more complex behavior with increases in brain size, yet recent work with
captive fowl has demonstrated that they also possess many of
these same capabilities, but do not have the predicted changes
in brain size. Chickens therefore present a scientific challenge,
as well as an ethical one, given their treatment during commercial food production.
In this paper we will begin by outlining the cognitive capacities of chickens as revealed in recent experimental work.
We will then move on to show how the theories currently espoused to account for such capacities fail to adequately explain
the case of chickens. Finally, we examine some of the ethical
implications of this work, including its relevance to the 3Rs
that govern experimental research with captive animals.

2. The cognitive capacities of fowl
Wild fowl and domestic chickens demonstrate complex cognitive abilities. Fowl communicate using sophisticated vocal
and visual signals and show remarkable behavioral flexibility
as well as sensitivity to the attentional states of others during
social interactions. They also perform abstract and social transitive inferences. Below we will discuss the significance of
these capacities as well as the methods used to show that fowl
possess them.
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Chicken communication is complex, consisting of over 24
different types of vocalizations as well as visual displays (Collias and Joos 1953). However, the size of the repertoire is not
its most remarkable feature. Fowl communicate using signals
that are functionally referential (Evans and Evans 1999; Smith
and Evans 2008, 2009), and representational (Evans and Evans
2007). These signals are also individually distinctive, which facilitates recognition of individuals (Candland 1969) and the use
of reputation in future social interactions (Pizzari 2003).
Functionally referential signals convey information about
external events in an environment in the absence of any other
contextual cues (the term “functional” acknowledges that the
underlying cognitive processes are not well understood (Marler
et al. 1992)). Observational studies, followed by experimental
manipulation of the signal’s usage, allow researchers to determine the context in which the signals are produced and the
responses of the receivers. If a tight correlation between the
specific eliciting event and the receivers’ responses is found,
the signals can be said to function to convey information about
the event and potentially even specific information about how
to respond to the event.
Functionally referential communication has been identified in many primate species as well as other mammals such
as meerkats (Manser 2001) and perhaps most famously, vervet
monkeys (Seyfarth and Cheney 1993). Several species of birds
also possess this ability, including ravens (Bugnyar et al. 2001)
and chickadees (Templeton et al. 2005). These findings contradict previous assumptions that animal signals only contain
information about the affective state (e.g. frightened or aggressive) or about the physical attributes of the caller (e.g., size or
health). They further suggest that rather than the receiver’s be-

© Between the Species, 2012

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 15, Issue 1

78
Carolynn L. Smith

havior being a simple reflexive “stimulus-response”, that there
may be an intervening cognitive step which involves a mental
representation of the event (Evans 1997).
Fowl produce four functionally referential signals, two in response to predators and two in the context of food. The major
classes of predators are terrestrial and aerial (McBride et al.
1969). When a terrestrial predator is detected, both males and
females produce alarm calls composed of a series of loud, short
pulses, which alert the group to the predator’s presence. Members of the group respond to the call by standing erect, scanning
the horizon and alarm calling, and may then flee for cover or fly
into nearby trees. Terrestrial predators typically hunt using ambush tactics and are more likely to terminate a hunt if detected.
The vocalizations may help to coordinate the group’s escape
behavior and may potentially deter the predator’s attack. The
response to aerial predators is much more nuanced. Unlike terrestrial predators, which rely on stealth to capture their prey,
aerial predators rely on speed of attack from a distance, which
means that vocalizing in their presence increases the likelihood
of being detected and caught. Males hence employ a range of
risk compensation tactics during an aerial predator encounter
(Kokolakis et al. 2010). The first is to call only in the presence
of a female (Wilson and Evans 2008). Although this still increases his risk, it also increases the chances that his mate and
offspring will survive, thereby benefiting him through “inclusive fitness”. Second, not all calls are equally risky. By varying the composition and duration of the calls, he can produce
a call that is difficult for the predator to localize but that will
still alert his mate (Wood et al. 2000; Bayly and Evans 2003).
The third factor affecting the likelihood, composition and duration of the calls is the male’s personal risk. Males gave longer
duration alarms, which increase the likelihood of signal detec-

© Between the Species, 2012

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 15, Issue 1

79
Carolynn L. Smith

tion by both the female and the predator, when they are close
to a refuge (and therefore more difficult to catch). They are
also more likely to call in response to their rival’s call when
they are protected under the cover of a tree or shrub. Lastly,
dominant males produce longer calls when their subordinate is
nearby. By selectively calling when the subordinate is close by,
the dominant may further reduce his risk of capture by giving
the predator more than one target (known as the “dilution effect” for predators choosing between multiple targets (Bertram
1978) and the “confusion effect” when prey is fleeing (Schradin
2000)).
The females’ response to an aerial predator is also very different from their reaction to a terrestrial predator. Females
crouch down and sleek their feathers and only flee once the
predator approaches. Females will only aerial alarm call if they
have chicks to protect. These behaviors reveal how dangerous
an aerial predator can be and hence the importance of being
cryptic.
The discovery of food is another important event about
which fowl communicate. Upon finding food in the presence
of a hen, males perform the tidbitting display. This display is
composed of a series of rhythmic motions and pulsatile vocalizations, which are audible up to 30 meters from the male (Davis and Domm 1943). This functionally referential call is individually distinctive and allows females out of visual contact
with the male to determine that he has located food (Stokes and
Williams 1971, 1972; Evans and Evans 1999). The characteristics of this vocalization (individual distinctiveness and longdistance audibility) enable another suite of interesting behavior
in this complex society, including eavesdropping and the use of
reputation in mate choice. Females prefer to mate with males,
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regardless of their social rank, that provide food more often
to any female in the group (Pizzari 2003). In addition, mating
does not always occur immediately after the tidbitting event.
This reveals two aspects of the female fowl’s behavior: first
that females eavesdrop on the food calling behavior of males in
relation to other females, and second, that they must remember
the behavior of males to express this mating preference (i.e.,
the individual male’s reputation for providing food).
The nature of the tidbitting display also creates a third opportunity. Because both components of the tidbitting display
are redundant, a receiver perceiving either component would
recognize that the signaler is indicating the presence of food.
The subordinate male exhibits behavioral flexibility that takes
advantage of this fact. Dominant males respond to a subordinate’s food calling and tidbitting display with overt aggression,
often chasing the subordinate away from the food and then
food calling themselves (Stokes and Williams 1972). To avoid
this aggressive response, subordinate males omit the more
conspicuous vocalizations and perform only the visual display
when the dominant male is attentive. When the dominant male
is distracted, the subordinate performs the combined display,
which alerts eavesdropping females. This flexibility allows the
subordinate to reduce the social cost of calling while still attracting a female. This behavior also reveals that the subordinate is sensitive to the attentional state of the alpha male (Smith
and Evans 2011).
The referential nature of food calls allows for another surprising behavior: deception. Males occasionally call in the absence of food (Gyger and Marler 1988). This brings the female
close to the male where she can be more easily defended from
other males. Experimental data shows that the females stop
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responding if the male calls too often in the absence of food
(Evans and Evans, unpublished data). This provides further
evidence of the use of long-term memory, eavesdropping and
reputation in this social system.
Food calls are also remarkable because they appear to be
one of the few animal signals that is not only referential, but
also representational; meaning the behavioral response of the
listener is mediated specifically by its own information about
the event (Evans and Evans 2007). It is as if the signal creates
in the receiver a mental representation of an object or event.
Significantly, this later capability has only been demonstrated
in fowl and a few primate species.
Beyond their sophisticated communication, behavioral flexibility and sensitivity to the attentional state of others, fowl and
domestic chickens have also been shown to perform a number of other reputedly cognitively complex capabilities, such
as transitive inference and social learning. The ability to infer
the relative status of a series of objects or individuals has been
suggested to be a measure of logical reasoning ability (Piaget
1928). Hens observing the interactions of a known status individual with an unknown individual are able to infer their own
status relative to the unknown individual and to respond appropriately in future interactions (i.e., dominantly or submissively,
Beaugrand et al. 1997). Furthermore, chicks tested on an experimental task where series of pairs of items were presented were
able to infer the relative rank of each item in new pairs relative
to the established hierarchy (Daisley et al. 2009). These results
from the social experiments are intriguing because they suggest
that the birds may be capable of a mental ‘simulation’ of future interactions based on their indirect experience with an individual. Regardless of the underlying cognitive mechanisms,
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it does appear that the birds are capable of self-assessment and
comparisons between themselves and others.
In addition to inferring social relationships, fowl are also
able to learn from other individuals in the flock (Nicol 2006).
This social learning can be advantageous in an unpredictable
environment. It provides the flexibility of individual learning
but can reduce the costs associated with attempting a new behavior (e.g., trying a new type of food) through trial-and-error
learning. Chicks gain information about palatable food from
their mother and she in turn changes her behavior in response to
the competency of her chicks. Adults are also capable of learning from other adults and appear to do so more from dominant
individuals (perhaps because dominants are more successful in
general (i.e., find more food, have more young)) or because
the birds monitor the dominant’s behavior more closely as described above in the case of food calling). Learning through
either imitation, where the individual copies the knowledgeable
actor’s motions exactly, or emulation, where a novel method is
used to obtain the same outcome, are believed to require more
complex cognitive processes (Zentall 2003; Whiten et al. 2004)
than trial-and-error learning. However, it has proven notoriously difficult to demonstrate conclusively that fowl are using
either imitation or emulation when learning from the demonstrator. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is learning.

3. The evolution of complex cognition and larger brains
Brains are energetically expensive, consuming 20% of the
daily energy intake of an adult human but accounting for only
2% of the body weight (Moore 2011). It is hence generally expected that animals with larger brains will have higher cognitive faculties than those that are less well endowed. However,
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this assumption raises a host of questions. How should brain
size be measured? What constitutes higher cognitive skills?
What were the selective pressures (environmental, social, or
developmental) that lead to enlargement of the brain (known
as encephalization)? All of these questions are inter-related and
the way in which they are approached affects the conclusions
reached about which animals have higher cognitive skills.

4. When it comes to brains, how big is big?
There have been many different methods used to measure the
relative size of animal brains across different taxa (see Healy
and Rowe 2007 for review). The most direct method is to compare the ratio of the whole brain volume to the volume expected
for its body size. While this method is relatively straightforward
and may be useful when comparing within a taxonomic group
(e.g., primates), environmental constraints may dictate brain
size more than cognitive function when comparing across taxa.
For example, bats need to be aerodynamic and lightweight to
maintain flight capabilities so their brains are neuronaly dense
but still relatively small, whereas cetaceans have no such constraint and have a less dense neuronal structure and are larger
compared to body size. This method would also not reveal if
there were trade-offs in different brain regions that kept the
brain volume the same but increased cognitive function. A second approach is to compare the ratio of the volumes of different
regions of the brain or of the volume of specific regions to the
volume of the whole brain. It is well known that certain regions
of the brain perform different functions. The brainstem, which
includes the hindbrain and midbrain, primarily controls unconscious functions, such as respiration and blood circulation, as
well as postural control and coordinating motor activity. The
forebrain, also known as the telencephalon, is associated with
higher cognitive functions (e.g., learning, memory, language
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(André Parent 2003; Jarvis 2009)). During development, the
hindbrain develops first, followed by the forebrain. When comparing different species, the majority of the differences appear
in the forebrain. It is speculated that this is because it is easier
to modify structures that are still growing later in the development (Finley 2009). Although mammalian and avian brains
differ in their architecture, there are structures that are assumed
to perform similar functions (Reiner 2005; Herold et al. 2011).
Researchers often focus on two parts of the telencelphalic section of the brain, the hyperstriatum ventrale and neostriatum in
birds and the isocortex (or neocortex) and striatum in primates
(Lefebvre et al. 2004). These have been dubbed the “executive”
brain. This method of comparing specific parts of the brain may
hence be more revealing regarding the evolution of specific regions in response to selective pressures (Reader and Laland
2002; Shultz 2010; Lefebvre et al. 2004). However, a region of
the brain may have multiple functions. This confounds efforts
to identify specific enlargement of brain areas with increased
cognitive abilities (Healy and Rowe 2007). All of the methods
used attempt to correlate encephalization with higher cognition
as demonstrated by more complex behaviors.

5. How to measure higher cognition
Behavioral flexibility has been cited as a key indicator of
social intelligence (Jones 2005) and is associated with complex communication (Tomasello 2008). Behavioral flexibility
is the ability to deviate from established routines to solve novel
problems, including innovation (i.e., novel solutions to environmental or social problems), social learning (the acquisition
of information from others), and tool use. A recent study by
Reader and Laland (2002) examined the behavioral flexibility
of 116 primate species. They found a positive relationship between the rate of innovations and tool use as well as in tool use
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and social learning and brain size (as measured by “executive
brain” volume ratio to brainstem volume). Similar studies have
been conducted to compare the foraging innovation rate of different species of birds with their overall brain size (Overington
et al. 2009). Overington et al. (2009) examined reports of different types of novel feeding techniques (such as tool use, feeding from anthropocentric sites, feeding on new food sources)
and the number of innovations observed from 803 species in 76
families (phyllogenetic groups). As expected, birds with larger
brains exhibited more feeding innovations and a higher diversity of innovation types.

6. Under pressure: why do animals need to be
smarter?
Several theories have been proposed to explain the evolution of complex behavior and complex cognition. The two
dominant theories focus on environmental or social pressures
as the drivers of more cognitively complex capabilities. These
capabilities in turn require conformational changes in the brain
to enable the performance of ever more demanding cognitive
tasks.
The ecological hypothesis postulates that complexity or
variability in the environment was the driver for more complex cognition; spatial navigation through large territories in
search of ephemeral food sources or the need to hunt moving
prey required larger brain capacity to meet these demands.
This environmental variability should also favor species that
are behaviorally flexible and therefore able to use innovative
foraging strategies and exhibit other novel behaviors. Evidence
to support this hypothesis includes the fact that species with
larger brains tend to be better at invading new habitats and exhibit more novel feeding behaviors than smaller brained spe-
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cies (Overington et al. 2011; Lefebvre et al. 1997). Further evidence comes from primate ecology; fruit-eating primates have
larger relative brains than leaf-eating primates and species with
larger home-range size tend to have larger brains. In addition,
fruits are a high-energy food source that may allow the animals
that feed upon them to develop larger brains. One potential detractor for this theory is that animals from different taxonomic
groups but with similar diets living in the same environment do
not all show similar brain enlargement. This suggests that foraging requirements could not be the sole driving force behind
brain enlargement and complex cognition (Schultz 2010).
Other researchers have speculated that social structure, including group size, strength of social bonds and complexity of
inter-group relationships, should be positively associated with
higher cognitive skills (Dunbar and Shultz 2007). There has
been some strong evidence that the complexity of the relationships is related to brain size. A loose aggregation of individuals,
such as a flock of birds feeding on seeds or insects, probably
does not require any difficult negotiations between group members. Individuals stay with the group as long as it is beneficial
to them. However, long term connections, either between pairs
during parental care, or between multiple individuals of different ranks, may require more long-term memory, the ability
to infer third-party relationships (e.g., kin, dominance) and the
need to coordinate group activities, such as foraging or group
defense (Dunbar and Shultz 2007), as well as a greater ability
to communicate about external events in the environment. In
addition, group living creates direct competition with other animals for similar resources, such as food, shelter and mates. Individuals that can gain additional resources through manipulation or deceptive tactics will benefit more from group membership. This type of behavior creates pressure on individuals to
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detect and counter deceptive behavior. This leads to a feedback
loop of ever more complex behavior as individuals continually
innovate and adapt in order to gain the most benefit from group
living. The hypothesis that deception and counter-deception
lead to higher cognition is known as the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne and
Whiten 1988).
These two hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive.
It seems likely that a combination of environmental and social
factors may have played a role in the evolution of complex cognition.

7. Where does this leave the chicken?
Red Jungle fowl (Gallus gallus) are the ancestral form of all
domesticated chickens. These ground-dwelling birds evolved
in the forests of Indonesia, Ceylon and China. Both males and
females have a dominance hierarchy. All groups consist of one
dominant male and one dominant female, subordinates of both
sexes (up to 12 in the case of females) and juvenile offspring.
The average fowl social group consists of six individuals. The
dominant male defends a territory and over the course of the
day, the group travels around their home range to watering
holes and food sources, such as termite mounds and fruiting
trees. This daily mobility creates the opportunity for animals
to interact with other groups. Group membership is typically
stable, however juveniles and subordinate males may move between groups over the course of a season. Chicks are precocial,
born able to feed themselves, although they require their mother
for thermoregulation and to gain information about food item
selection. They gain complete independence from their mother
at six weeks of age (McBride et al. 1969).
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Based on the theories put forward to explain the conditions
under which higher cognition is predicted to have evolved, fowl
exhibit the expected level of cognitive and behavioral abilities.
In light of these abilities, chicken brains would be expected to
show the same pattern of enlargement of specific regions of
the brain as other birds that exhibit such behaviors, like crows.
However, most methods of correlating brain characteristics and
cognition indicate that fowl should be on the lower end of the
cognitive abilities scale. Using the telencephalon ratio method
places jungle fowl near the bottom of the list. Of 154 species
of bird examined, wild jungle fowl ranked 137th (Burish et al.
2004).
There are two possible explanations for why chickens exhibit complex cognitive skills but do not measure up in terms
of brain size or brain ratios. The first possibility is that much
of what is attributed to complex cognition is actually achieved
through associative learning or development of a “rule-ofthumb” based on prior experience. There are several stumbling
blocks to this explanation. The first is the use of environmental
and social risk factors when aerial alarm calls are produced.
The opportunity to learn through observation, particularly during dangerous encounters may be very limited. In the case of
alarm calling where one male is put at risk by the behavior of
another, it may be more difficult to establish the subtle interactions involved because the outcome may not be immediately
clear and attempts to observe the interaction may be confounded by the learning animal’s need to hide during the interaction. This behavioral flexibility, as well as their ability to form
transitive inferences and to into account the attentional state of
others, suggests that fowl possess a more sophisticated understanding of their social interactions.
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The second possible explanation is that the size and density of neurons within the brain and the connectivity between
the different regions of the brain may be more important in
determining cognitive function than the overall brain volume
or brain region ratios typically measured. This means that efficiency or connectivity would be more important than simple
size (Shultz 2010). Monkeys and apes provide an example of
this possibility. There are no systematic differences in the great
apes’ neocortex ratio compared to that of monkeys’ but great
apes perform behaviors that suggest that they have more cognitive capabilities. Richard Byrne (1997) proposed that this
greater cognitive ability in great apes was achieved by “software adaptations”, meaning a reorganization of how information is stored, which did not require structural changes. New
research into human brain connectivity, called “connectomes”,
may yield greater insight into how the interconnectedness of
brain regions maps on to brain functions (Joshi et al. 2010).

8. Ethical implications
Science cannot answer normative questions; it cannot furnish values to guide ethical decision making. It can however
provide facts and theories that describe, explain and predict
elements of the workings of the empirical world and can therefore play a role in informing ethical decision making.
The science outlined in this paper challenges common thinking about chickens. Chickens are not mere automata; instead
they have been shown to possess sophisticated cognitive abilities. Their communication is not simply reflexive, but is responsive to relevant social and environmental factors. Chickens demonstrate an awareness of themselves as separate from
others; can recognize particular individuals and appreciate
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their standing with respect to those individuals; and show an
awareness of the attentional states of their fellow fowl. Further,
chickens have been shown to engage in reasoning through performing abstract and social transitive inferences. This growing body of scientific data could inform a rethinking about the
treatment of these animals.
Broiler or meat chickens are typically housed in 100 meter
by 12 meter sheds with between 20,000 and 50,000 animals
per shed (Robinson and Hulme 2004). At a maximum stocking density this translates into almost 42 birds per square meter of space. Meat chickens have been selectively bred for fast
growth, such that when they are slaughtered at 6 weeks of age
(the age at which a wild chicken would just become independent from its mother), these birds weigh more than their adult
wild counterparts. Research has also shown that because of
their exceptionally high rate of growth and weight gain there
is a high potential for leg fractures, foot problems, heart failure
and other serious conditions, such as obesity, prior to slaughter.
In order to prevent these problems, young broiler birds must
be kept on a severely calorically restricted diet, which means
they suffer from extreme hunger (Duncan 2010). Male chickens hatched in the egg-laying and meat industry production are
killed on the day they hatch by maceration because they are
unsuitable for either industry.
The facts surrounding the housing of hens in the egg-laying
industry are similar to those in the meat industry. Approximately 90% of the commercial eggs laid are in “cage” systems. In
the conventional cage system, each bird gets 400 cm2 of unrestricted floor space but no nest boxes, litter for foraging or dust
bathing or perches (CSIRO 2002). High stocking density and
the lack of environmental enrichment leads to aberrant behav-
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ior, such as feather pecking and cannibalism. In response to
these problems, the beaks of the birds are routinely trimmed
using hot blades or lasers. These procedures can lead to chronic
pain for the life of the bird. The European Union has banned
unenriched cages as of January 1, 2012 and will require at
least 600 cm2 of cage area per hen (European Union Directive
1999/74/EC). As consumers become more aware of the facts
regarding these intensive farming systems, other housing systems, such as “barn-laid” and “free-range” systems for egg
production are becoming more popular. This change in buying behavior based on a perception of improved animal welfare
suggests a change in the public’s attitude towards the treatment
of farmed animals.
Intensive farming practices have made chickens cheaper
and more readily available for human consumption. However
these intensive production systems cause some birds to have
chronic pain; others to have their legs break under their own
weight or to be attacked or killed by their cage mates. If, as
some philosophers have argued, moral standing is grounded in
the possession of such capacities as communication, awareness
and rationality, then we have provided evidence that suggests
chickens merit at least some moral consideration. And if they
do, then the physical, social and psychological harms routinely
inflicted on them through their use in meat and egg production
are made problematic.
Scientific research into animal welfare can inform changes
in the intensive farming systems that may reduce the likelihood
of these physiologically adverse events. However, as suggested
by Bryant (2007) and others, there is a significant tension at
play here. In order to establish that nonhuman animals have
ethical worth grounded in their possession of certain capacities
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and to understand what constitutes good practice toward them,
scientific experimentation is required, yet experimentation on
nonhuman animals is in itself ethically problematic. In the case
of chickens, much of what is known about their capabilities has
been learned through captive studies, since fowl, like most species, are cryptic in the wild. It is very difficult to track individuals and to record their social interactions. Although observations of animals in the wild provide the basis of our understanding of natural behavior, these natural settings limit the types of
experiments possible and level of experimental control. This
may therefore reduce the strength of conclusions that can be
drawn.
Whenever captive animals are used in research in Australia
and many other similar jurisdictions, the scientists must adhere
to the 3Rs. These require, where possible, the Replacement of
animals in research, Reduction in the number of animals used
and Refinement of techniques and technologies used in order
to minimize pain and suffering and to avoid “death as an endpoint” (i.e., euthanasia at the completion of the experiment).
A notable feature of the experimental work with chickens is
the extent to which these researchers have rigorously applied
the 3Rs and in fact gone beyond these principles. For example,
live chickens have been replaced with 3D animated animals in
some experiments. This refinement of the experimental method
enables behavioral and physical characteristics to be manipulated on an animated virtual bird without harming a live one.
Birds react naturally to the animation and the animation provides precise control over the virtual bird’s actions (Smith et
al. 2009). This also reduces the number of birds that need to
be held in captivity since the animation can be changed to suit
each new experiment.
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Furthermore, those who do research with chickens have begun to pursue a new interpretation of the 3rd R (Refinement).
Because chickens have a fast reproductive cycle new animals
can be sourced on a constant basis, nonetheless researchers go
to great lengths to avoid “death as an end-point” for their study
subjects. This new approach involves Retiring experimental
animals to places outside of the research realm. Researchers
frequently find good homes for their animals, including adopting out the birds to chicken fanciers (people who raise and
show them at competitions or simply keep them as pets), or
donating them to zoos for exhibition. Though the suggestion
of re-homing experimental animals might seem far-fetched,
this principle has been raised in recent public consultations
on revisions to the “Australian Code for the Care and Use of
Animals for Scientific Purposes” (National Health and Medical
Research Council 2011, section 3.9.3).

9. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that recent experimental work
with chickens demonstrates they are much more cognitively
complex than previously thought. We have explained how this
research demonstrates the difficulty in measuring cognitive
abilities and the ongoing challenge of linking cognitive function to brain architecture. We have also discussed how those
who do research with chickens go beyond what is mandated by
the current “Code of Practice” and frequently re-home their experimental animals. We maintain that the re-homing of experimental animals could profitably be explored in other behavioral
research settings and recognize that some researchers on other
species have also taken the initiative in this area. Finally, although there is the question whether the ethical treatment of
an animal should be tied to its cognitive ability, we think that
the research we have discussed may provide a new perspective
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for the public on the manner in which chickens are raised and
routinely killed to suit human dietary desires.
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